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gard of the safety of others'. Because of the ambiguous use of
these words they are not used in the Restatement of this Sub-
ject."87
Adoption of this rule would permit application of the comparative
negligence statute and allow a factual consideration of who caused
the injury.
J. W. WILKUS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATUTES RESTRICTING
PICKETING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. Recent sessions of state and
municipal legislative bodies witnessed considerable agitation for new
statutes or amendments to existing labor codes more or less designed
to offset the advantages gained by organized labor through legislative
and judicial decisions of recent years.1 Such legislation has to a large
extent been directed at picketing and related activities. In Wisconsin
such activity has produced the Catlin Anti-Picketing Act 2 and the
8 Ibid.
'Examples are the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70; The
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449; the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act,
Ch. 111, Wisconsin Stat. (1937). Cases are: Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937) ; Lauf v. Shinner Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct.
578 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703
(1938); Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Co.,
215 Wis. 623, 256 N.W. 56 (1934); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. &
H. of A., 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936); and the Senn decision in the Wis-
consin court, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936).
''Wis. Laws 1939, c. 25. The bill was introduced by Assemblyman Catlin at
the instance of R. 0. Wipperman of Milwaukee, a lobbyist, on February 2, 1939.
The next day an identical companion bill, 65S, was introduced in the Senate by
Senator White. The first draft of the Catlin bill, never actually introduced, for-
bade picketing by anyone not an employee for six months and provided a penalty
of $10.00 to $100.00 or a ten to sixty day jail sentence. The bill as introduced
by Assemblyman Catlin abolishing "stranger" picketing defined a labor dispute
as a controversy between an employer and "two or more of his . . . employees,
or their representatives," and provided that "no labor dispute shall be deemed
to exist unless the controversy results in a strike or lockout. "
On February 17, Mr. Wipperman had an amendment prepared for 65S which,
however, was introduced in the Assembly by Assemblyman Ludvigsen as a
substitute for the Catlin bill in its original form. It was this proposal that be-
came the present law. (The legislative history of the Catlin Act is drawn from
files in the office of the Secretary of State and the Legislative Reference Li-
brary.)
The Ludvigsen amendment went much farther than did the original bill.
It forbade not only "stranger" picketing, but all minority picketing. A "labor
dispute" was defined as a "controversy between an employer and a majority
of his employees in a collective bargaining unit." There is no definition of a
"collective bargaining unit" in the act, but compare §111.02 (6) of the Em-
ployment Peace Act (Ch. 57, Laws of 1939,) which defines the unit as all
the employees of one employer within the state, except where a majority of the
employees in a "single craft, division, department or plant" shall have voted
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Employment Peace Act.3 Similar acts have been passed elsewhere 4
while some states have in effect limited picketing by legislation reg-
ulating the conduct of labor disputes generally. 5 Other legislatures
considered restrictive legislation at the last session but failed to take
decisive action.
6
This activity raises the problem of the constitutional power of
the legislature to restrict peaceful picketing. It is the purpose of
this comment to consider whether restrictions on the presentation
of messages by picketing7 violates the right of free speech.8
by secret ballot to be a separate bargaining unit. By §111.06 (2) (e), picketing
"or any other overt concomitant of a strike" is made an unfair labor practice,
unless majority in a collective bargaining unit shall have voted by secret ballot
to strike.
' The Wisconsin legislature repealed the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act and
passed the Employment Peace Act, Wis. Laws 1939, c. 57. This act provided
for the establishment of a new labor board and established "unfair labor prac-
tices" for both employer and employee. Relevant sections for a discussion of
picketing rights are 111.02 (8) (12), 111.04, 111.06 (2) (a-b-e-f-g-i), 111.07
(4), 111.11, 111.15. The latter section contains a provision that nothing in the
act should "be so construed as to invade unlawfully the right of freedom
of speech." Since the legislature could not do the unconstitutional in any case,
it is difficult to see the value of such a clause. It may aid the court when
interpreting the act in concluding that the legislature had no intention of
exerting its control over free speech to the maximum limit. This provision of
the act was contained in amendment 2A offered by Mr. Peterson, the Assembly-
man who introduced the bill itself.
'Oregon adopted an anti-picketing law by referendum in the 1938 November
election which is similar to the Catlin Act but adds restrictions against sympa-
thetic strikes and jurisdictional disputes. For text see 4 L.R.R. 331, November 14,
1938.
Several cities have put restrictions on picketing, including Antioch, San
Diego, and Los Angeles, California, and Flint, Michigan. The Los Angeles ordi-
nance has secret ballot provisions in addition to the restrictions of the Oregon
statute. For text of Losl Angeles law see 4 L.R.R. 79 (September 26, 1938).
The Minnesota statute, Minn. Laws 1939, c. 440, text at 4 L.R.R. 303
(May 1, 1939), is less restrictive than those cited above. Section 11 requires only
that a majority of those picketing an employer be on strike. Sections 1(g)
and 11(e), relating to stranger picketing and jurisdictional disputes, are less
severe than are the statutes cited above. (For the corrected form of section
11(e) see 4 L.R.R. 341.)
The Michigan Labor Relations Act requires notice to the Labor Board
before striking (§§9 and 9a), restricts strikes in the public utility field (§13) and
restricts "coercion" in strikes (§17). See House Enrolled Act No. 184, approved
June 8, 1939; text at 4 L.R.R. 602 (June 19, 1939).
The Pennsylvania Act is even less directly aimed at picketing except for the
implications of the "coercion" clause of §6 (2) (a) and (e). Pamphlet Laws
1168; text at 4 L.R.R. 604 (June 19, 1939).
'Idaho House Bill 306, restricting picketing, was killed by a pocket veto.
4 L.R.R. 342 (May 8, 1939).
'The term "picketing" is used in this comment in the generally accepted
sense of the completely orderly and peaceful activity of patrolling before a
store, factory, etc., for the purpose of advertising to the public the existence
of a difference of opinion with the employer over a matter relating to labor
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Freedom of speech and press, protected against encroachment
from the federal government by the First Amendment,9 are protected
conditions; it includes appeals for aid to patrons of the employer and to his
employees by placards, banners, handbills, or oral communications.
8 There have been some indications of belief in state courts that anti-picketing
laws were unconstitutional because violative of the right of free speech. In
People v. Harris, 91 P. (2d) 989 (Colorado 1939), the court held the 1905
Colorado anti-picketing statute unconstitutional because it was a "denial of
free speech". In Fornilli v. Auto Mechanics Union, 93 P. (2d) 422, 426 (Wash.
1939), a dissenting justice would protect picketing from injunction because of a
constitutional right to assemble and to publicize grievances. Other intermediate
and lower court decisions taking this ground are Ex parte Lyons, 89 P. (2d)
190 (Cal. 1938); People of Cal. v. Watson, No. 2824, July 6, 1939, California
Superior Court, Contra Costa County (holding unconstitutional the anti-picket-
ing ordinance of Antioch, California) reported in 4 L.R.R. 789 (July 24, 1939);
Commonwealth v. Harris, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsyl-
vania, March 15, 1935, reported in C.C.H. Labor Law Service p. 16264, par.
16112; Scott Burr Stores Corp. v. Specter, Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas, L.R.R.
May 29, 1939, p. 30. Most of these cases rest on mere assertion of the principle of
free speech rather than on thorough analysis of the theoretical considerations.
A decision handed down since the writing of this article which gives a careful
analysis of the problem is: Reno v. Second Judicial District Court, 95 P. (2d)
994 (Nev. 1939).
This is not to imply that this is the only ground of attack on the con-
stitutionality of anti-picketing legislation. It is to be expected that the problem
will be considered from many angles by the United States Supreme Court at this
term of court in determining the validity of an old Alabama anti-picketing act,
in Thornhill v. State, 189 So. 913 (Ala. 1939), cert. granted, December 11, 1939,
as reported in 7 Law Week 696, December 12, 1939. Some grounds other than
free speech for contesting the validity of anti-picketing legislation are:
A. A state anti-picketing act might be found to be invalid because it con-
flicts with some portion of the federal labor acts. See W.L.R.B. v. Fred Rueping
Leather Company, 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673 (1938). The enlarged sphere of
federal authority over commerce in recent years makes this important. N.L.R.B.
-v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668 (1939); and see Consolidated Edison
Company v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 222, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 213 (1938). But compare
Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., decided November 29, 1939, by C.C.A. (3d),
and at this writing reported in full only in 5 L.R.R. 375! (Dec. 4, 1939) for the
proposition that the federal government must clearly have intended to occupy
the whole field of regulation.
B. The majority rule provision in the statutes may be so arbitrary and
unrelated to the objects of the legislation as to make the laws void under
the due process clause. It may be queried what object within the scope of the
police power is served if representatives of 49% of the employees are re-
strained from picketing but those of 51% are not. A lower court decision holding
such a provision wholly unreasonable in the Los Angeles statute is People v
Gidaly, No's. CR A 1602 and 1607, July 18, 1939, California Superior Court,
Appellate Department, Los Angeles County, 4 L.R.R. 826 (July 31, 1939) and
5 L.R.R. 216 (October 30, 1939). For an opposite view by a lower court see
A.F.L. v. Bain, Three Judge Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Oregon, July 8,
1939; 4 L.R.R. 824, 826 (July 31, 1939).
For applications by the United States Supreme Court of the majority rule
doctrine in labor disputes see Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515,
559, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 605 (1937); and N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 45, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 628 (1937).
C. The Catlin act makes it unlawful to picket or "to interfere" with an
employer's business or with any person desiring to transact business with him
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against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The basic prob-
lem to be discussed here is whether the activity of picketing comes
within the meaning of free speech or free press. If it does, the re-
mnaining problems are first, whether the state can restrict the right
of free speech in this case because of its proprietary control of the
streets; and second, whether picketing restrictions are properly with-
in the scope of the police power even though free speech is re-
strained."
I. Is Picketing Within the Meaning of Free Speech or Press?
The terms speech and press mean more than mere oral com-
munication or newspaper message. A picketer's, banner, placard, or
leaflet may come within the scope of Lovell v. Griffin:
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.'
2
And the act of picketing is as clearly within the meaning of speech
as is the display of a red flag, given constitutional protection in
Stromberg v. California.13 Hence, if picketing fails to come with-
in the absence of a labor dispute. Is the word "interfere" so vague as to make
the statute void for lack of due process? For a thorough discussion of the
principle that a staute may be void for indefiniteness and that the rule applies
to civil as well as criminal statutes, see Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 247 U.S.
445, 458, 47 Sup. Ct. 681, 685 (1927); for a more recent case see Lanzetta v.
State, 59 Sup. Ct. 618 (1939).
For a suggestion that the word "interference" is not too vague when ap-
plied to restrict employer activity, see Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Railway Clerks,
281 U.S. 548, 568, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 433 (1930). Query, when applied to employees:
Vague injunctions with similar terms proved so harsh and impracticable
in application, §9 of the Norris-La Guardia Act and its companion Wis. Stat.
§103.58 were enacted. For recognition by the Supreme Court of this purpose,
see Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 563, 57 Sup.
Ct. 592, 606 (1937).
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ....
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937); dissenting
opinion, Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 336, 343, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 128, 131
(1920) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) ; Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) ; Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct.
625 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct.
444 (1936); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1937); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59
Sup. Ct. 954 (1939) ; The Handbill Cases, 7 U.S. Law Week 582 (1939) ; and see
for a discussion of the development to the Gitlow case, Charles Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1936) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431.
' This approach to the problem is modeled after that of the Supreme Court
in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
"303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 669 (1938).
283 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931).
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in the meaning of the First Amendment, it must be for some reason
other than that it is not identical with oratory.
In determining the constitutional status of picketing, the fact
that it has historically been placed by the courts on the periphery
oi illegality may be given some weight. In the first American case
unionization itself, fifteen years after the adoption of the First
Amendment, was declared a conspiracy. 14 Unionization's legality
remained in doubt for three decades. 15 Even recently picketing has
frequently been held illegal. 1 6 In 1905 a federal court said:
There is, and can be, no such thing as peaceful picketing, any
more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or
lawful lynching.
17
This view was approved as recently as 1919 in California.18 Many
courts have held peaceful picketing legal,' 9 but have frustrated the
activity by a narrow interpretation of the word "peaceful". 0 In
1921 the United States Supreme Court condoned the presence of
one picket at each gate of a plant,2' but as recently as 1932 many
courts have in effect made picketing illegal.
22
', "A combination of workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a
two-fold point of view: one to benefit themselves ... the other is to injure
those who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns both." Phila-
delphia Cordwainers' Case (1806) discussed in Frankfurter and Greene, The
Labor Injunction p. 2 (1930).
"The landmark decision upholding the legality of organization is Common-
wealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (Massachusetts 1842).
" Cases in effect taking this view are, e.g., Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis,
135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W. 450 (1918); Ellis v. Journeyman Barber's Union, 194 Iowa
1179, 11 N.W. 111 (1922) ; Paramount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407,
140 So. 328 (1932). These cases are discussed in Cooper, The Fiction of Peace-
ful Picketing (1936) 35 Mich. L. R. 73.
'
7 Atchison Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (S.D. Iowa 1905).
"Moore v. Cook's etc. Union, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417 (1919).
"Federal examples: Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Company, 166
Fed. 45 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908); Bittner v. West Va. & Pittsburgh Coal Company,
214 Fed. 716 (C.C.A. 4th, 1914).
"Picketing has been held intimadatory when a "peaceable, law abiding
man" was "compelled to pass by men known to him to be unfriendly." Kolley
v. Robinson, 187 Fed. 415, 417 (C.C.A. 8th, 1911). And picketing has been held
not to be peaceful when the pickets were "hollering different things" including
the term "cattle". Sona v. Aluminum Casting Co., 214 Fed. 936 (C.C.A. 6th,
1914). A number of state cases of similar import are collected by Cooper in his
article cited in note 16, supra.
"The Court, however, noted something "sinister", a militancy "incon-
sistent with peaceful persuasion" in the word "picket". American Foundries v.
Tri City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921).
"See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 N.C.L.
Rev. 158; for a very careful discussion of factors considered by the courts in
their treatment of labor disputes, see Eskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion"
in Labor Disputes (1937) 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 456.
[Vol. 1940
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Many recent decisions upholding the right to picket are based,
not on constitutional immunity, but on statutory enactments. The
Wisconsin court for example has found full protection for picketing
in statutory authority:
We cannot say that the legislature may not validly permit acts on
the part of labor organizations not intrinsically wrongful as in-
volving violence, intimidation, or misrepresentation, the purpose
of which is to give notoriety to the attitude of an employer in a
labor dispute.
23
There is no evidence either here or in two recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, which are most favorable to picketing,
that the concept of constitutional protection to picketing has ever
even occurred to the court. 24
The condition of these authorities is some indication that picket-
aig is not within the meaning of 'free speech at all. For how can
an activity so recently held illegal leap so suddenly to the priv-
ileged position of constitutional protection? And if protection to
picketing is based solely on statutes, cannot the legislature freely
take away what it has given ?25 On the other hand the chain of cases
outlined above reveals a constant development of the status of picket-
ing in the eyes of the courts, and it would appear on the basis of
the most recent decisions that picketing has completed the journey
to a position of constitutional privilege.
One of the most important of those recent decisions is Senn v.
Tile Layers Union in which Mr. Justice Brandeis for the Court
said:
Clearly the means which the statute authorizes-picketing and
publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Members of a union might, without special statutory authoriza-
tion by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute for free-
'American Furniture, Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A., 222 Wis. 338, 364,
268 N.W. 250, 262 (1936). Italics supplied.
'
4New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938).
Lauf v. Shinner Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938). These decisions are
based on the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act.
2 It might be argued that judicial decisions are not under the due process
restriction of the Fourteenth Amendment while legislative acts are. But a
change in the established construction of a statute may violate due process:
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863). Therefore the many 'illegality" de-
cisions would have no bearing on what a legislature might possibly do. For a
short suggestion that a decision reaching a certain result may be constitutional




dom of speech is guaranteed by the federal constitution ...
If the end sought by the unions is not forbidden by the Federal
Constitution, the state may authorize working men to seek to at-
tain it by combining as pickets, just as it permits capitalists and
employers to combine in other ways to seek their desired economic
ends. 26
The justice here says that there is a constitutional right to "make
known the facts" of a labor dispute. Did he speak of picketing as the
method for this publicity? Since the entire case, as well as the sen-
tences immediately surrounding the italicized portion above, does
deal with picketing, the crucial sentence would be a surprising ir-
relevancy if it did not refer to the same thing. And it is to be noted
that picketing is explicitly stated to be no more a mere permissive
right--i.e., a right subject to the mandate of the state-than is the
"combination" of capitalists or employers.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Handbill Cases27 lends
strong support to the view that picketing is within the meaning of
free speech. The Handbill Cases were a group of four cases treated
as one by the Supreme Court for the purpose of decision. All of them
involve the distribution of leaflets in violation of law. Three of the
cases involved religious or political problems, but the fourth, Snyder
v. Milwaukee, a decision appealed from the Wisconsin supreme
court, 28 involves as defendant a picket who stood in front of a meat
market distributing leaflets concerning a strike against the shop.
The Supreme Court held that the ordinances violated the constitu-
tional right of free speech. This would appear to be conclusive evi-
dence that the Supreme Court considers picketing for some purposes
at least to be within the meaning of free speech and press. If anti-
picketing ordinances are to be sustained, it must be on some other
ground than that picketing is not in any sense an exercise of the
right of "free speech".
29
301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 862 (1937). Italics supplied.
27Supra note 10.
'Milwaukee v. Snyder, 230 Wis. 131, 283 N.W. 301 (1939).
' Of course the state cases holding that anti-picketing ordinances are viola-
tive of the right of free speech necessarily conclude that picketing is included
within the meaning of free speech. (Cases collected in note 8.)
For a tacit assumption that picketing is within the meaning of free speech,
although a particular restraint was not invalid, see Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.
v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939), cert.
denied, November 23, 1939, and rehearing denied December 14, 1939. The question
is reserved in Fur Workers Union Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, 105 Fed.
(2d) 1, 12 (1939), supra note 9.
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II. Control of Streets by Legislature
If a state has absolute control of its streets, such as a householder
has of his home, then a state could forbid the use of its streets even
for purposes protected by free speech. The Supreme Court formerly
held this position, as stated in Davis v. Massachusetts in 1897.30 The
conviction of Davis for making speeches in Boston Common contrary
to a city ordinance was affirmed.
In Hague v. C. I. 0., involving the right of the C. I. 0. and
others to hold public meetings in Jersey City, counsel for Mayor
Hague, relying on the Davis decision, contended that the city might
be as arbitrary as it chose in restricting the use of public streets and
parks. Respondent C. I. 0. in its brief argued that the Davis case
was decided more than 25 years before the Supreme Court ruled
that freedom of speech was included within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment :31
The analogy pressed in the Davis Case, and by the petitioners
herein, between the interest of the public authorities in the public
places and the interest of a private homeowner in his home, be-
comes inapposite once it is granted that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects against the invasion of the right of free speech.
To the private homeowner the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment do not apply. To the public authorities, they do.
3 2
Although the Supreme Court declined to expressly overrule the
Davis case as unnecessary to the decision in the Hague case, it would
appear that all possible meaning was "distinguished" out of the
Davis rule. The Court found that streets and parks were held in trust
for the public and that they had always been used for purposes of
assembly and discussion.3 3 When the Handbill Cases3 4 discussed
above were decided a few months after the Hague case, the Court
did not find it necessary even to mention the problem here discussed.
From these decisions it may be concluded that anti-picketing stat-
utes cannot because of the state's ownership of the streets over-ride
the protection given to free speech.
" 167 U.S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731 (1897), affirming Com. v. Davis, (per Holmes,
J.) 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
'Supra note 10.
'Respondent's brief p. 58 in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954
(1939).
"Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939). Compare the dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Butler for his complete reliance on the Davis decision as
ruling the instant case.
"d Supra note 10.
March]
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III. Are Picketing Restrictions Within the Scope of Police Power?
A. The Presumption of Constitutionality. It has become a max-
im of the courts that there is a presumption in favor of the con-
stitutionality of police power regulation. For example:
The existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary com-
mercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional un-
less in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of
the legislatorsAs 5
Such a presumption, if it applies to legislation affecting civil
rights, will make it correspondingly difficult to show the uncon-
stitutionality of anti-picketing ordinances. The writer concludes to
the contrary, that a "presumption of unconstitutionality" attachs to
statutory limits on free speech. Analysis of the free speech cases
since the Supreme Court extended the Fourteenth Amendment to
cover certain basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights3 6 shows that
in the early cases the Supreme Court applied the presumption of
constitutionality as fully to civil liberty cases as to other cases.3 7
In the subsequent civil liberty cases, however, the majority opinions
have ignored the presumption of constitutionality as though it never
existed. This was particularly evident in the case of Near v. Minne-
ota, despite the contention of Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting for him-
self and three colleagues, that the act should be upheld because of
the presumption."8
The state of the cases thus implies that the Supreme Court has
no intention of applying the presumption of constitutionality to civil
liberty cases, and the implicit becomes explicit in the Handbill Cases:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as, diminishes
'U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 783
(1937). For a general discussion of the presumption see Note (1936) 36 Col.
L. Rev. 283.
"Cases listed supra note 10.
' See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 630 (1925)
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 646 (1927).
'Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931). Contrast the dissent
by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 57
Sup. Ct. 650 (1937), where he would hold unconstitutional on free speech




the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the reg-
ulation of the free enjoyment.of the rights.8 9
In the Carolene case, quoted above as an example of the appli-
cation of the presumption of constitutionality in commercial"
matters, Mr. Justice Stone in a footnote to his opinion expressed
the thought that the presumption might not apply to "legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation".41 This raises
the question of whether the "presumption of unconstitutionality" is
to be applied in all civil liberties cases or only in those in which the
statutes in question directly affect political activity. Granting that
picketing is not within this category, it is nevertheless believed by this
writer that the Supreme Court has no intention of so subdividing
civil liberties. This is evidenced by the failure to apply the pre-
sumption of constitutionality in the Hague and Lovell cases42 where
the rights were of a non-political nature, and the presence of the
statement quoted above in the Handbill Cases, one of which, as has
been pointed out, was a labor case.
43
This being the state of the authorities, it is concluded that anti-
picketing legislation will not have the benefit of the presumption of
constitutionality and may even face a contrary presumption.
B. General Police Power Control of Free Speech. The question
remaining for consideration is, are picketing restrictions on the right
of free speech constitutional as an exercise of the police power. It is
established, for example, that in time of war the state may, when
necessary to preserve itself, make some speech restrictions on the
'7 U.S. Law Week 582, 584 (November 22, 1939); and compare for a
similar view St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38, 73, 77, 83, 56
Sup. Ct. 720, 735, 737, 739 (1936), concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis.
"Note that Mr. Justice Stone in the quoted portion of the Carolene opinion
speaks only of "legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions."
" 304 US. 144, 152, footnote 4, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 783 (1937).
"Cited supra note 10.
" Supra note 10. For a brief discussion of this subject emphasizing the pro-
tection of civil liberties see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme
Court (1938) 50. It is to be noted further that Mr. Justice Stone in the footnote
under discussion cites as examples of his observation cases involving religious,
national, and racial minorities.
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exercise of free speech. 44 However, the words used and the surround-
ing circumstances must show a "clear and present danger" to the
state.
45
The post-war cases have been followed by a series of decisions in
which the Supreme Court has taken a much stricter view of legisla-
tive power, 46 holding that only utterances inimical to the state in the
clearest fashion may be restricted. The post-war view has been that
of a rule of reason,47 and this of necessity is extremely difficult to de-
fine in objective terms. The task the Supreme Court has taken upon
itself is:
• . . to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substanti-
ality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights• . 48
But this always within the limits of the "clear and present danger"
theory. 49
If the theory outlined here expressed the whole of the state's
power to restrict free speech, a necessary conclusion would be that
anti-picketing legislation, when directed at peaceful picketing, was
unconstitutional; for peaceful picketing would not appear to offer
any overwhelming danger to the state. But it would appear from the
"Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919); Frohwerk v. U.S.
249 U.S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249 (1919) ; Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct.
252 (1919); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919); Schaefer v.
U.S., 251 U.S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920); Pierce v. U.S., 252 U.S. 239, 40
Sup. Ct. 205 (1920); O'Connell v. U.S., 253 U.S. 142, 40 Sup. Ct. 444 (1920);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920).
"Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).
41 Supra note 10.
4 "The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to
the safety of the state." Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258, 57 Sup. Ct. 732,
739 (1937).
" Handbill Cases, 7 U.S. Law Week 582, 584 (November 22, 1939).
4In re Ford Motor Co., 14 NLRB No. 28, 4 L.R.R. 921 (August 10, 1939)
is an example of restriction of speech by the Labor Board. In this case the Ford
Company was charged with distributing lists of "Fordisms" to its employees.
The "Fordisms" were statements critical of unionism, as "Our men ought to
consider whether it is necessary for them to pay some outsider every month for
the privilege of working at Ford's." Ford Company claimed that these were
merely expressions of opinion, but the Board found that they had a coercive
effect causing the employees to fear for their jobs and their promotions. The
Board stated that the guarantee of suc'h rights as the N.L.R.A. gives employees
would be "wholly ineffective" if such "coercion" were tolerated.
This writer considers that if the tests of permissible free speech restriction
are those outlined up to this point in the comment, the N.L.R.B. decision is
thoroughly wrong. Time enough for it to act when words become deeds. If
this decision is correct, then the anti-picketing statutes must also be constitu-




decisions that the state has greater powers of regulation where pri-
vate rights are involved than where the problem is solely one of the
relation of state and individual. This may be inferred from a state-
ment by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States:
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.50
It is important to note that in the great opinions which are land-
marks of civil liberties, the only seeker for protection from "danger"
is the state which by its legislative branch would afford itself pro-
tection. Thus in Near v. Minnesota, Delonge v. Oregon, Herndon v.
Lowry, Lovell v. Griffin, no private rights were involved ;51 even in
Hague v. C. I. 0. and the Handbill Cases, 2 although both have labor
aspects, private rights were only indirectly concerned. In the latter
case Milwaukee was not trying to protect the butcher's property or
business, but merely to keep refuse off the streets.
When a union pickets, the employer may suffer a direct pecun-
iary loss; his "property rights" may be injured. The courts have
always required that to be justified such damage must arise in the pur-
suit of a lawful purpose by the one doing the damage. The legal doc-
trine involved here has been stated by Mr. Justice Holmes:
The intentional infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an
act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is
actionable if done without just cause. . . . When the defendant
escapes, the court is of the opinion that he has acted with just
cause ...
But whether and how far a privilege should be allowed is a ques-
tion of policy. Questions of policy are legislative questions and
judges are shy of reasoning from such grounds.' 3
-250 U.S. 616, 628, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 21 (1919). Italics supplied.
5 Supra note 10.
' Supra note 10.
'Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Italics sup-
plied. This article does not specifically deal with labor problems but it seems certain
that such problems were in the mind of the author as the editorial note (8 Harv.
L. Rev. 52) describes the significance of the article solely from that standpoint.
lFrankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 24 speak of this
treatment by Holmes and his application of it in certain cases as "The fountain-
head of analysis of this problem." Compare for a statement of this principle
in a case, Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 3 (1904).
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An application of this principle to an actual labor situation4 is
seen in Dorchy v. Kansas, where Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke for the
Court:
A strike may be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly
the manner in which it may be conducted. To collect a stale claim
due to a fellow member . .. is not a permissible purpose ...
Neither the common law nor the Fourteenth Amendment confers
the absolute right to strike.55
Extremely significant in this connection is this paragraph from
Frankfurter and Greene:
The damage inflicted by combative measures of a union-the
strike, the boycott, the picket-must win immunity by its pur-
pose. But neither this nor any other formula will save courts the
painful necessity of deciding whether, in a given conflict, the
privilege has been overstepped. 6
The theory arising from this discussion is that there are different
standards of legislative power to repress speech where property rights
are directly involved. If this theory is accepted, the state has far less
power to restrict political and conscientious activity than it has to
prevent the infliction of temporal damageA7 This view was followed
in a recent Illinois decision. In that case the union protested an in-
junction restraining picketing on free speech grounds; the court dis-
tinguished all previous free speech cases on the ground that they
"did not involve the construction to be given in cases of conflicting
constitutional rights"5 and granted the injunction. The Rueping
decision of the Wisconsin supreme court seems, somewhat subcon-
"For a related development to the principle of restraint of temporal damage
in labor disputes, consider the growth of injunctive relief against trade dis-
paragement. Derenberg, Trade Mark Protection and Unfair Trading (1936) 137;
Nims on Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (3d ed. 1929) for non-consti-
tutional angles. See Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640.
"272 U.S. 306, 311, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 87 (1926).
"The Labor Injunction (1930) 25.
"If this distinction is ever fully adopted and applied by the Court, the
analogies from restrictive "private" legislation which are used to support re-
strictive "public" legislation would lose currency. Thus the statement by Mr.
Justice Holmes in the Schenck decision that a man has no constitutional right
to counsel murder would lose all relevancy; for the murder case involves private
temporal damage, while the Schenck case involves only the individual and the
state.
'" Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 11. 377, 393,
21 N.E. (2d) 308, 316 (1939), cert. denied, November 23, 1939, and rehearing on
plea for certiorari denied December 14, 1939.
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sciously, to have followed much the same theory in this respect al-
though in the Wisconsin case it was the employer, not the employee,
who was restricted5 9
Thus two possible conclusions remain. If, as suggested by Mr.
Justice Holmes in the italicized passage above, the policy involved in
justifying temporal damage is a legislative problem, the unions can
do no more than point to their established property right in organ-
ization6" and demand at least evenhanded treatment. If, on the other
hand, the Court should decide that the legislature can set policy as to
the infliction of temporal damage subject to the same strict require-
ments put upon political rights (the "clear and present danger"
theory, above) this entire argument will fall. Such a view would ne-
cessitate the overruling of the Illinois case referred to.6 '
Other possible police power grounds for upholding anti-picketing
legislation are that it may prevent violence 62 or preserve the eco-
nomic welfare of the state. Three factors must be kept in mind,
however, when weighing these considerations: first, that under the
hypothesis here presented these contentions will not have the benefit
of the presumption of constitutionality; second, they will have to
prevail over the argument suggested above that the particular means
chosen by the anti-picketing acts are arbitrary and have no reasonable
relation to the desired objectives ;63 and third, that at least so far
as these purposes are other than to protect against the infliction of
temporal damage, they must be justified by the overwhelming neces-
sity of the state.6 4
JOHN FRANK
" "The right of free speech has never been considered to make impossible
civil remedies or criminal prosecutions for libel, duress, or fraud, although
speech was the agency in each case. The distinction between the exercise by
an employer of his right of freedom of speech and the actual use of the spoken
work as an instrumentality to overpower the will of employees is well under-
stood and constitutes the dividing line between what an employer may do and
what he may not do ... " W.L.R.B. v. Rueping, 228 Wis. 473, 496, 279
N.W. 673, 683 (1938).
'"Texas & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 571, 50 Sup. Ct.
427, 434 (1930).
"The Ford case discussed in note 49 supra, would also have to be over-
ruled.
This ground was accepted in A.F.L. v. Bain cited slipra note 8 (B).
'Supra note 8 (B)
It may be possible that even if the anti-picketing acts should be held
unconstitutional for violating the right of free speech, the legislatures might be
able to achieve precisely the same ends by passing laws making it unlawful for
the employer to do any of the things which might be the objects of minority
or stranger picketing. If, for example, it were made unlawful for an employer to
bargain collectively with the representatives of less than half of his employees,
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